Rewiring Maritime Order in the Horn of Africa: India, Israel, and Somaliland as a Laboratory of Informal Security Governance

Introduction: Power Vacuums and Functional Influence

The contraction of American soft-power engagement across parts of the Global South has not produced strategic emptiness. Instead, it has opened space for middle powers to advance functional models of influence that combine security provision, institutional capacity building, and selective technological leverage. Nowhere is this dynamic more visible than in the Horn of Africa. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland should therefore not be read as a narrow diplomatic gesture. It constitutes part of a broader process of regional rewiring, intersecting directly with India’s evolving Maritime Neighbourhood doctrine. Together, India and Israel are shaping an alternative model of maritime order, one that privileges resilience over control, capacity over coercion, and functionality over formal alignment.

This article argues that Somaliland has emerged as a Laboratory of Informal Order, a testing ground for a new form of maritime statecraft that advances the strategic interests of both India and Israel while offering African actors, most notably Ethiopia, a viable alternative to dependency-driven or base-centric security arrangements.

Africa and India’s Maritime Statecraft

Over the past decade, India has redefined Africa as a central arena in its Global South strategy and a core component of its maritime security architecture. The continent is increasingly framed in Indian strategic discourse as a “maritime neighbourhood” a space in which security, trade, connectivity, and development are mutually reinforcing.

This vision is institutionalised through India’s SAGAR and MAHASAGAR frameworks, which link maritime security to economic growth and regional stability. Africa is also pivotal to India’s defence-industrial ambitions, particularly its objective of reaching USD 5 billion in defence exports. That goal is unattainable without deep, institutionalised, and long-term engagement across African security ecosystems.

Crucially, India’s approach differs from dominant external models. Rather than exporting security through heavy basing or debt-laden infrastructure, India emphasises capacity building, training, doctrine development, and interoperable systems adapted to local operational realities. This makes Africa not merely a market, but a partner in shaping alternative security practices within the Global South.

Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland: A Multi-Vector Security Move

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland constitutes an atypical yet carefully calibrated strategic intervention in the Horn of Africa. Its significance was markedly amplified following the direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2025, which highlighted Tehran’s growing interest in exploiting fragile and weakly governed spaces along the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa as platforms for indirect pressure and forward positioning. In this context, the move should be understood not as a symbolic diplomatic gesture, but as a security-driven response to an evolving threat environment.

Beyond the Iranian dimension, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland also intersects with, and implicitly challenges, the regional strategies of two additional actors. Turkey has rapidly expanded its security footprint in Somalia and adjacent maritime corridors through a combination of permanent military facilities, training missions, and deepening political influence, positioning itself as a dominant extra-regional actor in the western Indian Ocean. China, for its part, has consolidated an entrenched presence in Djibouti that integrates military basing with debt-financed infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, thereby anchoring a base-centric model of maritime influence.

Israel’s approach diverges from these models. Rather than relying on heavy force projection or permanent deployment, it privileges a functional security posture centred on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, digital monitoring, port security, and maritime domain awareness. This emphasis on technologically enabled, low-footprint capabilities aligns closely with India’s own preference for flexible presence and capacity-building over formal basing or alliance entanglement. The convergence of these approaches facilitates a natural division of labour between Israel and India, in which complementary capabilities are leveraged to advance shared security objectives while minimising political exposure and strategic escalation.

The Ethiopian Anchor: Land Power Seeking Maritime Access

India’s strategic posture in the Horn of Africa was consolidated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s December 2025 visit to Addis Ababa, which elevated India–Ethiopia relations to a strategic partnership. For India, Ethiopia being Africa’s most populous landlocked state and host of the African Union represents both political gravity and Global South legitimacy.

Ethiopia’s core vulnerability is maritime. Near-total reliance on Djibouti, increasingly under Chinese influence, constrains its strategic autonomy. Access to a secure, sovereign maritime corridor is therefore not a commercial preference but a national security imperative. Berbera Port in Somaliland offers precisely such an outlet.

Here, Israeli recognition intersects directly with Indian strategy. By enabling Ethiopia’s access to an alternative maritime corridor, the India–Israel–Somaliland axis weakens Chinese leverage, dilutes Turkish dominance, and embeds Ethiopian growth within a diversified security environment.

Somaliland as a Laboratory of Informal Order

Somaliland’s unique status i.e., stable, functional, yet internationally unrecognised, makes it an ideal policy laboratory. It allows external partners to operate below the threshold of formal alliance politics while still generating tangible security outcomes.

Three capability domains define this laboratory:

ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).

Advanced ISR systems including unmanned platforms, satellite integration, and sensor networks enable continuous situational awareness and real-time operational intelligence. India contributes physical infrastructure and human-capital training, while Israel provides the digital “eyes.” This configuration is particularly suited to states with vast EEZs but limited monitoring capacity.

Port Security.

Secure ports are prerequisites for sovereign trade. India’s investment in physical infrastructure is complemented by Israeli multi-layered physical and cyber port security ensuring that ports function as protected sovereign corridors rather than vulnerable chokepoints. This is foundational to any sustainable blue-economy strategy.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

MDA synthesises disparate data streams into an integrated maritime picture. For India, aspiring to be the Indian Ocean’s “first responder,” MDA is a strategic multiplier. Israeli systems enhance India’s ability to counter piracy, illegal fishing, and non-state threats without large military footprints. Together, these capabilities generate positive dependency: African partners rely on Indian-Israeli systems not for coercion, but for daily governance of their maritime space.

Bridging the African Security Implementation Gap

Africa does not lack a security doctrine. Frameworks such as the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) articulate a clear vision of collective defence and African-led crisis response. Yet implementation has lagged. Mechanisms like the African Standby Force have never reached full operational readiness.

This gap has invited ad hoc external interventions by the United States, France, and others, often framed as counter-terrorism. While tactically effective, such interventions reinforce dependency and bypass African institutions.

India offers a different model with an African-led, African-embedded security. Rather than substituting African forces, India works through institutional capacity building, AU-aligned training, and interoperability. Israel’s technological edge complements this by delivering operational capability without political overreach. Somaliland demonstrates how such a model can function informally, operationalising African security principles even where formal mechanisms remain stalled.

From a strategic perspective, the emerging India–Israel partnership in the Horn of Africa generates complementary advantages for both actors. For India, cooperation in this theatre reinforces its leadership claims within the Global South by translating normative commitments into operational outcomes. It supports New Delhi’s defence-export objectives by deploying tailored, cost-effective security solutions aligned with the specific needs of African partners, while simultaneously enabling a westward extension of India’s maritime influence without the political and strategic constraints associated with formal alliance structures. For Israel, the partnership offers a means to counter Iranian and Turkish encroachment in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa without resorting to heavy or permanent military deployment. By embedding Israeli technological capabilities within a broader, legitimacy-enhancing framework anchored in India’s Global South outreach, Israel enhances the political sustainability of its security presence. At the strategic level, this cooperation also extends Israel’s effective reach along a critical corridor linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, thereby integrating maritime security considerations into a wider regional posture grounded in functionality, resilience, and indirect influence rather than overt power projection.

Constraints and Risks

This model is not without challenges. African political fragility, rising debt, and food insecurity threaten long-term stability. India also faces a legitimacy paradox as supporting Somaliland risks tension with AU norms on territorial integrity. Finally, technological competition, particularly from proven Turkish systems requires the India–Israel package to demonstrate clear operational and economic superiority.

Conclusion: Sovereignty, Resilience, and Informal Order

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not an endpoint but an entry point into a broader strategic experiment. Together, India and Israel are exploring whether maritime order can be built through capacity, legitimacy, and embedded security, rather than bases and dependency. Somaliland, as a Laboratory of Informal Order, illustrates how middle powers can reshape regional security architectures without forcing formal realignment. In doing so, they offer not just an alternative to Chinese and Turkish models but a potential template for Global South-led security governance in the 21st century.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of CNAWS.