Indian Cities Under Siege: Weaponised Drones and Gliding Rockets in the New Era of Urban Security

From Gaza to Delhi: The Logic of Hamas-Style Systems

Hamas and similar groups rely heavily on improvised rockets and low-cost UAVs. This offsets the asymmetry they face against conventional militaries. These groups favour volume, surprise, and geographic reach over exquisite precision.

Data Point: The al-Qassam Brigades have demonstrated their ability to launch hundreds of rockets within a matter of hours. This achieves a saturation effect designed to overwhelm advanced defence systems, such as Israel’s Iron Dome.

The Delhi module appears to have studied these methods closely. They sought to adapt them for a dense Indian megacity. The plan combined gliding projectiles, rail-launched UAVs, and payload-dropping multirotor drones. This mix allows for rapid, multi-vector strikes. The core logic is simple yet potent: exploit commercially available technologies and easily sourced materials. This provides a standoff strike capability that bypasses many traditional physical security measures.

Anatomy of the Planned Arsenal

Investigative details suggest the use of a layered system. It is composed of four primary, improvised air weapons:

• Gliding rockets: These are lightweight and easily transported. Their range is reportedly up to 25 km. They enable three launches within roughly a minute. They are designed for rapid disruption over a wide impact zone. The specific design likely mimics the 'Qassam' series rockets. Although inaccurate, these rockets have a high rate of fire and a low production cost, estimated at under $1000 per unit.
• Pneumatic rockets: Compressed gas is used for initial acceleration. This offers a more stable and controllable launch platform. Payload capacities are marketed in the range of 2–50 kg for medium-range urban strikes. This pneumatic method is key. It significantly reduces the loud report and heat signature associated with traditional solid-fuel rockets. This complicates early detection in noisy urban environments.
• Rail-launched UAVs: These function as gliding projectiles or powered UAVs. They use simple propulsion to traverse long distances at high speed. They can carry heavier explosives. Fixed launch rails help standardise deployment. This suggests a focus on rapid, repeated deployment from hidden locations.
• Payload-dropping drones: These are modified commercial drones that have been adapted for specific purposes. They mount a small underbelly release mechanism. They drop grenades or small bombs from above. This enables “top-attack” profiles in dense urban terrain. This exploits the structural weaknesses of roofs and lightly armoured vehicles. A standard commercial drone can carry a payload of up to 2.7 kg. This is enough to deliver a lethal IED or multiple modified grenades.

Organised, Not Lone-Wolf: The Human Architecture

The Delhi plot shows that improvised air and rocket capabilities are team-based projects. They require technical and organisational depth. This contradicts the “lone-wolf” attack narrative.

The plot involved Jasir Bilal Wani, alias Danish, a technically proficient facilitator. He allegedly provided expertise in drone modification and rocket-making. This illustrates the necessary convergence of engineering skill, logistics, and operational planning.

Building and operating this arsenal demands several parallel efforts:

• Airframe fabrication, propulsion, warhead integration, power systems, and guidance or stabilisation must be done simultaneously.
• Supply chains are needed for chemicals, mechanical components, batteries, and electronics. Many of these items are legally purchasable but are dual-use in nature. High-discharge LiPo batteries, common in hobbyist racing drones, are a key indicator of dual-use exploitation.
• Secure communications and financial channels are necessary. They coordinate procurement, testing, and deployment. They must also avoid early detection.

This organisational requirement elevates such cells. They become quasi-military entities. They draw on knowledge diffusion from foreign theatres. They also use online technical ecosystems.

Global Precedents: DIY Airpower

The system envisioned for Delhi aligns with a broader global trend. Non-state actors are weaponising commercial and improvised aerospace systems.

In Gaza, non-state groups have used scalable rocket arsenals and UAVs. They favour rate of fire and area coverage over accuracy. A 2024 analysis showed that short-range rockets have a guidance error (CEP) of over 1 kilometre. This confirms the goal is terror and disruption, not precision.

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has normalised the use of small drones. Quadcopters and fixed-wing drones are used for both reconnaissance and precision lethality. This includes bomb drops on trenches and logistics hubs. Data Point: Ukrainian forces alone are using or losing up to 10,000 small drones per month. This creates a vast pool of operational knowledge that is easily shared online. This battlefield normalisation speeds up knowledge transfer. Designs, techniques, and tactical concepts quickly migrate to digital communities. This lowers the barrier for terror modules to copy the technology.

Urban Vulnerability and Attack Geometry

If executed, these systems could have amplified damage in the National Capital Region. Gliding rockets and pneumatic launchers enable strikes from outside hardened inner-city perimeters. Rail-launched UAVs and payload-dropping drones exploit vertical access corridors and blind angles. Traditional ground-based policing does not routinely monitor these areas.

Key urban vulnerabilities include:

• Critical infrastructure nodes like power substations, fuel depots, and communication hubs. These are often located near dense civilian clusters. An attack on a major power grid could cause a cascade failure affecting millions.
• High-value symbolic targets and crowded event spaces. Vertical drone attacks here could cause a disproportionate psychological and political impact.
• Emergency response bandwidth. This can be rapidly saturated by simultaneous low-intensity strikes. Triage, evacuation, and forensic investigation become difficult. The deployment of three rockets in one minute, plus two concurrent drone strikes, would quickly exceed initial responder capacity.

The strategic aim is not only physical destruction. It is systemic overload. The attackers want to force civil administration and security into a reactive mode. This happens under conditions of confusion and public panic.

Legal, Regulatory, and Counter-Drone Imperatives

India’s response must not be purely kinetic. It requires a convergence of regulation, technology, and institutional practice. This mirrors global debates on autonomous weapons.

On the regulatory side, granular control is needed. This includes oversight of high-energy batteries and certain dual-use chemicals. Robust KYC and transaction monitoring for high-payload commercial drones are also required. This raises the cost and visibility of assembling the arsenals. The existing Digital Sky Platform and the Drone Rules, 2021 must be continually updated. They need to specifically track sales of drones with payload capacities exceeding 5 kg, which are most easily weaponised.

Technologically, layered Counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems are vital. These integrate RF detection, radar, and electro-optical tracking. They must be adapted for dense urban environments, not just critical national infrastructures. Soft-kill options (such as jamming and spoofing) and selective hard-kill options must be employed. India’s security forces employ technologies like DRDO’s anti-drone system. This system uses laser-based options. It must be deployed with much higher density across the urban sprawl.

Institutionally, joint doctrine and rehearsed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are essential. These are needed among police, intelligence, and civil defence agencies. They help shift the focus from “incident response” to “pattern prevention.” This must include red-teaming of urban drone and rocket attack scenarios.

Implications for Deterrence

The Delhi module's plans add a new layer to India’s internal security narrative. The state must project high-end military capabilities externally. Also, it must demonstrate a credible capacity to defeat low-cost, high-ingenuity threats internally.

Visible disruption of such modules is important. This must be combined with calibrated public communication about preparedness. This helps shape adversary risk calculations. It signals that improvised airpower will not produce an asymmetric advantage.

However, over-securitisation of civilian drone and maker ecosystems risks stifling innovation. The policy challenge is creating a discriminating framework. It should enable beneficial UAV and rocket research under supervised conditions. At the same time, it must sharply constrain pathways for clandestine weaponisation. India’s iDEX framework should actively sponsor counter-drone and urban air traffic management solutions. This must be treated as a critical national security priority.

CALL OUT: The Next Step

The current threat landscape demands a paradigm shift in urban security. India must urgently transition from protecting isolated VIP locations to establishing a city-wide, multi-layered "Drone Dome" policy that integrates civil administration, police, and specialised military technology to ensure comprehensive aerial security.

(The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of CNAWS.)