Explaining the Lull in Terrorist Attacks in Jammu and Kashmir After Operation Sindoor

Since India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025, there has been a conspicuous absence of large-scale kinetic offensives inside Jammu and Kashmir directly attributable to Pakistan-based tanzeems such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Three interlocking dynamics appear to explain this lull. First, a strong deterrence effect created by India’s new doctrinal posture that treats any terrorist attack by Pakistan-based proxies as an act of war. Second, credible inputs indicate that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has tightened its command and control over LeT and JeM leadership, instructing restraint and focusing instead on infiltration and cadre building. Third, Pakistan’s internal instability marked by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks, the Baloch insurgency, and growing protests in Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) and Punjab has reduced Islamabad’s ability and willingness to support terrorist operations against India.

These factors together have changed the operational landscape in Jammu and Kashmir. The current calm is not an indication of peace but a temporary strategic pause born out of deterrence, control, and internal disorder.

Operation Sindoor and India’s New Normal

Operation Sindoor followed the brutal Pahalgam terrorist attack of 22 April 2025. India responded with precise strikes into Pakistan and PoJK targeting terrorist infrastructure. It was not just a tactical response but a strategic message that the era of limited retaliation confined to Indian territory had ended. India’s new normal is clear: any attack emanating from Pakistan-based proxies will be treated as an act of war against the Indian state.

This shift redefined deterrence in South Asia. It blurred the distinction between state and proxy and established a credible red line for Pakistan. Operation Sindoor demonstrated India’s willingness and ability to hold sponsors accountable and strike at will, even across the Line of Control. The public communication that followed was deliberate and strategic. It conveyed that India’s patience for cross-border terrorism had ended, and any future attack would invite consequences on Pakistani soil.

From the perspective of Pakistan-based tanzeems, this raised the cost of action dramatically. LeT and JeM depend on ISI for logistical support, intelligence, safe havens, and training infrastructure. With the threat of Indian retaliation now extending into Pakistani territory, even the ISI’s calculus had to change. Approving large-scale terrorist offensives now carries unacceptable risks of escalation and exposure.

ISI’s Tightened Control and the Tactical Pivot

Inputs received by the author from individuals aware of the on-ground situation in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir suggest that ISI has recently centralised its control over LeT and JeM handlers. Reliable sources indicate that ISI has issued clear instructions to avoid any major offensive operations in the near term. Instead, it has redirected efforts toward building cadre strength through selective infiltration and covert recruitment inside Jammu and Kashmir.

This operational pause and recalibration are consistent with ISI’s long-term management of proxy assets. Historically, the agency has alternated between periods of overt escalation and quiet rebuilding. After the shock of Operation Sindoor, ISI appears to have chosen the latter. By consolidating command and control, it prevents rogue elements or local commanders from launching actions that could trigger another Indian response.

The current phase therefore represents a quieter, low-visibility campaign. Infiltration is being prioritised over confrontation. Recent findings by the intelligence team at the Centre for New Age Warfare Studies (CNAWS) point to a significant and worrying strategic shift within Pakistan-based terrorist organisations Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Both groups have launched large-scale recruitment and fundraising drives across several Pakistani cities, including Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Rawalkote. What marks this new phase as particularly notable is their growing focus on the recruitment of women, a deliberate attempt to expand their influence base and operational flexibility under the guise of social and religious mobilisation.

This form of operational patience serves ISI’s interest. It preserves Pakistan’s deniability, reduces visibility in the international domain, and allows gradual reconstitution of its terror architecture. The lull is deceptive. It signals not the end of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir but the preparation of its next iteration.

Pakistan’s Internal Disorder: A Constraint on Adventurism

Pakistan’s internal situation has deteriorated sharply over the past year. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has expanded its reach, attacking security convoys and police stations across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In Balochistan, insurgent groups have stepped up operations against military targets and economic installations. Meanwhile, Pakistan is struggling with widespread protests in PoJK, where anger against Islamabad’s neglect has led to violent clashes. Simultaneously, Punjab province has witnessed periodic mobilisations by the hardline Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), challenging the state’s authority.

These developments have significantly strained Pakistan’s security apparatus. A large portion of its counter-terrorism and military resources are now tied up internally. The state’s coercive capacity has been stretched thin, and its monopoly on violence has weakened in several regions. The ISI, which manages both domestic and external operations, now faces a dilemma: allocating scarce resources between controlling internal unrest and maintaining pressure on India.

Politically, Islamabad also faces diminishing space for risky adventures. Any major proxy attack on India that provokes a retaliatory strike could further destabilise Pakistan domestically. For a government facing internal dissent and a restive populace, this is a risk few decision-makers are willing to take.

Thus, the internal disorder in Pakistan has acted as a natural brake on its external terrorism strategy. The ISI’s restraint and centralisation of control are as much a result of operational prudence as they are of compulsion.

The Interplay of Deterrence, Control, and Disorder

The three dynamics are deeply interconnected. India’s deterrence doctrine after Operation Sindoor has raised the cost of proxy warfare. ISI’s centralisation of control has reduced the risk of adventurism. Pakistan’s internal crises have constrained its operational bandwidth. Together, these forces have produced the current lull in high-profile terrorist offensives in Jammu and Kashmir.

However, it would be a strategic error to interpret this calm as permanent. Pakistan’s use of proxies has historically oscillated between escalation and dormancy, depending on political timing and international conditions. What India is witnessing today is a phase of consolidation and deception. The adversary is regrouping under the cover of restraint.

Indicators to Watch

Several early-warning indicators can help detect a potential reactivation of Pakistan-based proxies. A rise in infiltration attempts across the Line of Control, particularly during low-visibility months, would be an immediate sign of renewed activity. The detection of sleeper cells or the recovery of newly cached weapons and explosives within Jammu and Kashmir would further suggest that infiltration networks are being reactivated. Similarly, targeted killings or ambushes against political workers, security personnel, or non-local labourers could indicate a shift towards micro-level disruption aimed at spreading fear and destabilising normalcy. Sudden changes in ISI’s operational behaviour or leadership patterns within LeT and JeM would also be concerning, as such transitions often precede escalations. Additionally, political upheaval in Pakistan that emboldens military hawks to externalise internal instability through cross-border terrorism could serve as a catalyst for renewed aggression. Monitoring these patterns through Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), and ground-based HUMINT networks will therefore be critical to staying ahead of emerging threats.

Policy Recommendations for India

India must sustain the credible deterrence established through Operation Sindoor, ensuring that the threat of retaliation remains unquestioned. However, this deterrence should be balanced with measured restraint to prevent inadvertent escalation that could spiral into a broader conflict. At the same time, intelligence integration must be strengthened by improving coordination between central and state agencies for real-time information sharing. The fusion of SOCMINT and SIGINT capabilities with local policing and human intelligence networks will be crucial to detecting infiltration attempts and dismantling sleeper cells before they can operationalise.

Equally important is the protection of soft targets. With large-scale terrorist attacks currently deterred, Pakistan-based proxies may shift their focus toward smaller but high-impact strikes on civilians, tourists, or critical infrastructure. Strengthening the security of such vulnerable nodes through layered defences and rapid response mechanisms will be essential. India must also counter radicalisation and recruitment by addressing socio-economic vulnerabilities in Jammu and Kashmir. Promoting education, employment, and community engagement can help prevent the reactivation of recruitment pipelines in Jammu and Kashmir, thereby denying fresh local cadres to LeT and JeM.

On the diplomatic front, India must maintain narrative dominance by continuing to build global consensus that Pakistan’s patronage of terrorist proxies constitutes state sponsorship of terrorism. Sustained diplomatic pressure, coupled with a consistent strategic narrative, will ensure that Pakistan remains on the defensive internationally. By combining deterrence, intelligence integration, socio-economic measures, and diplomatic efforts, India can convert the post-Sindoor operational pause into a lasting strategic advantage.

Conclusion

The situation in Jammu and Kashmir after Operation Sindoor represents a critical juncture. The absence of major Pakistan-based terrorist offensives does not mean victory but reflects a temporary restraint imposed by deterrence, ISI control, and Pakistan’s internal disarray.

India’s doctrinal shift has successfully altered Pakistan’s risk calculus. Yet, the threat has not vanished; it has merely changed form. The enemy is adapting, moving from open confrontation to covert infiltration and subversion.

This is the moment for India to consolidate its advantage. Strengthening intelligence networks, fortifying deterrence, expanding socio-economic outreach, and sustaining diplomatic pressure can ensure that the lull becomes a long-term strategic gain.

The silence in the Valley is not peace; it is a pause before the next attempt. How India uses this pause will define the next chapter of counter-terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.